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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we discuss optimal contract drafting between a lender with deficient monitoring capabilities and an 
agency-ridden borrower with insufficient budget to finance an investable project. The theoretical implications are as 
follows: First, the first best solution (FBS) is achievable under no hidden action. However, the borrower’s action is 
hardly observable in practice. Second, with unobservable managerial decisions the borrower exerts sub-optimal effort 
(moral hazard), and the probability of default increases. Lastly, with a penalizing discretion entitled to the bank on a 
long-term contract, the financial intermediary will be able to control the firm’s managerial action effectively such 
that the solution is equivalent to the FBS attained under no hidden action. Empirical implications are followed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he sources of corporate external financing are either direct or indirect or both. Direct, disintermediated, 
or market-based financing taps the long-term investors in the capital markets via investment banks by 
issuing bonds and/or equities; whereas indirect, intermediated, or bank-based funding chanels the 
diversified depositors in the money market via commercial banks by taking loans (Tirole, 2005). Unobservable 
managerial decisions incur agency costs, and this paper attempts to address the theoretical and empirical questions of 
varying moral hazard behavior of firms with respect to the external sources of financing.  
 
In the literature, there have been extensive articles regarding the costs and benefits of relationship banking (Gopalan 
et al., 2011; Schenone, 2010; Drucker and Puri, 2009; Bharath et al., 2007; Boot, 2000). In our moral hazard-prone 
theoretical framework, money changes hands from a lender with deficient monitoring capabilities to an agency-ridden 
borrower with insufficient budget to finance an investable project. The theoretical implications are as follows: First, 
the first best solution (FBS) is achievable under no hidden action. However, the borrower’s action is hardly observable 
in practice. Second, with unobservable managerial decisions the borrower exerts sub-optimal effort (moral hazard), 
and the probability of default increases. Lastly, in case of a loan made with a penalizing discretion entitled to the bank 
on a long-term contract, the financial intermediary will be able to control the firm’s managerial action effectively such 
that the solution is equivalent to the FBS attained under no hidden action. Our contribution to the literature is that we 
formally model heuristic notions that are prevalent in the banking literature, and propose a feasible empirical model, 
identify variables, and provide predictions to test the theoretical implications.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, a theoretical moral hazard model shows that when 
the lender-borrower relationship is settled in the long run, the first best solution is achievable. Section 3 proposes 
statistical inference procedures to validate the theoretical model provided in Section 2. We conclude in Section 4. 
 
  
T 
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2. MODEL 
 
2.1. First-best solution under no hidden action 
 
We first consider an optimal contract under no unobservable managerial decisions. The assumptions are as follows: 
 
 There exist a lender (bank) and a borrower (manager). 
 The project outcome (𝑞) of the borrower will turn out either as a success (𝑢) or a failure (𝑑) whose 
second-differentiable probability measure of a successful operation (𝑢) depends on the borrower’s effort 
level	𝑎: ℙ 𝑢 = ℙ 𝑎 , where ℙ 0 = 0, ℙ ∞ = 1, ℙ′ 𝑎 > 0, and ℙ′′ 𝑎 < 0. 
 The lender earns 𝐷 = 𝛼𝑢, which depends on the financing type. For simplicity, let 𝛼 = 1, thus 𝐷 = 𝑢: 
The lender can extract all rent from the borrower. 
 The borrower is paid off by 𝐶1, which depends on the project outcome and on the financing type. It may 
be a managerial compensation, or a benefit/fine from relationship banking, where 𝐶2 = 𝑟 + 𝑘, 𝐶6 = 0 −𝑘, 𝑟 ≡ 𝑢 − 𝐷, and 𝑘 is the benefit from repayment or a loss due to a halt in banking relationship or a 
higher interest rate etc. 
 The respective utility functions of lender and borrower are 𝑉 𝑞 − 𝐶1  and 𝑈 𝐶1 − 𝛷 𝑎 , where 𝛷 𝑎  is 
the cost of effort. Furthermore, the reservation utility of the borrower is zero. 
 
Under these assumptions, the optimal contract can be drafted by solving the lender’s utility maximization subject to 
the borrower’s participation constraint: 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥>?,A [ℙ 𝑎 𝑉 𝑢 − 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝑉 𝑑 − 𝐶6 ] (1) 
 s. t.			ℙ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶6 ≥ 𝑎. (2) 
 
By Lagrangian, 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥>?,A,H ℙ 𝑎 𝑉 𝑢 − 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝑉 𝑑 − 𝐶6   								+𝜆[ℙ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶6 − 𝑎] (3) 
 
With respect to the argument variables, the first order conditions (FOCs) are  
 𝐶2: −ℙ 𝑎 𝑉′ 𝑢 − 𝐶2 + 𝜆ℙ 𝑎 𝑈′ 𝐶2 = 0 (4) 
 𝐶6:		− 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝑉′ 𝑑 − 𝐶6 + 𝜆 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝑈′ 𝐶6 = 0 (5) 
 𝑎: ℙJ 𝑎 𝑉 𝑢 − 𝐶2 − ℙ′ 𝑎 𝑉 𝑑 − 𝐶6 + 𝜆 ℙ′ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶2 − 𝑈 𝐶2 − 1 = 0 (6) 
 𝜆: ℙ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶6 ≥ 𝑎 (7) 
 𝜆[ℙ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶6 − 𝑎] = 0 (8) 
 𝜆 ≥ 0. (9) 
 
From these FOCs, we know that 𝜆 = KL(2N>O)QL(>O) = KL(2N>R)QL(>R) ≠ 0 per Borch rule. Thus, Equation (8) is binding as follows:  
 ℙ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶6 = 𝑎.  (10) 
 
Now, let us assume that both lender and borrower are risk-neutral: 𝑉 𝑥 = 𝑈 𝑥 = 𝑥. The upper conditions boil down 
to  
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−ℙ 𝑎 + 𝜆ℙ 𝑎 = 0 (11) 
 − 1 − ℙ 𝑎 + 𝜆 1 − ℙ 𝑎 = 0 (12) 
 ℙJ 𝑎 [ 𝑢 − 𝐶2 − 𝑑 − 𝐶6 ] + 𝜆 ℙJ 𝑎 𝐶2 − 𝐶6 − 1 = 0 (13) 
 ℙ 𝑎 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝐶6 = 𝑎. (14) 
 
From Equations (11) and (12) it follows 𝜆 = 1, thus  
 ℙJ 𝑎 𝑢 − 𝑑 = 1 and	ℙ 𝑎 = AN>R>ON>R. (15) 
 
Hence, the optimal levels of effort (𝑎∗), upside (𝐶2) and downside (𝐶6) managerial compensations are determined by ℙ′ 𝑎∗ = U2N6 and ℙ 𝑎∗ = A∗N>R>ON>R. Therefore, the FBS is attained under no hidden action as follows: 
 𝐹𝐵𝑆 = 𝑎∗, 𝐶2∗, 𝐶6∗ ℙ′ 𝑎∗ = U2N6 	⋀	ℙ 𝑎∗ = A∗N>R>ON>R . (16) 
 
However, observing the effort level (𝑎) in practice is infeasible or monitoring is very costly, thus agency problems 
arise. This nuisance may persist if (1) lender-borrower relationship is not set on a long-term basis, and/or (2) the fine 
(punishment) for a bad outcome is non-negative (𝐶6 ≥ 0). Let us now turn to when the action (𝑎) is unobservable to 
see how the managerial effort level diminishes. 
 
2.2. Second-Best Solution Under Hidden Action 
 
In addition to the assumptions previously given in Section 2.1 the borrower’s effort level is now assumed to be 
unobservable to the lender. The borrower maximizes her expected utility less effort level 𝑎 such that 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥A [ℙ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶6 − 𝑎], (17) 
 
whose FOC is 
 ℙJ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶2 − ℙJ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶6 = 1, (18) 
 
and this serves as her binding incentive criterion (IC) to be reflected in the lender’s decision making procedure. With 
conjectured effort level of the borrower, the lender faces his optimization problem as follows: 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥>?,A [ℙ 𝑎 𝑉 𝑢 − 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝑉 𝑑 − 𝐶6 ] (19) 
 s. t.			ℙ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶6 ≥ 𝑎 (20) 
 ℙJ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶2 − ℙJ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶6 = 1 (21) 
 𝐶6 ≥ 0. (22) 
 
Assuming that both parties are risk-neutral, the objective Lagrangian function is 
 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥>?,A,H,Z,[ ℙ 𝑎 𝑢 − 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝑑 − 𝐶6  +𝜆 ℙ 𝑎 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝐶6 − 𝑎 + 𝜇 ℙJ 𝑎 𝐶2 − ℙJ 𝑎 𝐶6 − 1 + 𝛾𝐶6, (23) 
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whose FOCs are 
 𝐶2: −ℙ 𝑎 + 𝜆ℙ 𝑎 + 𝜇ℙJ 𝑎 = 0 (24) 
 𝐶6:		− 1 − ℙ 𝑎 + 𝜆 1 − ℙ 𝑎 − 𝜇𝑝J 𝑎 	+ 	𝛾 = 0 (25) 
 𝑎:	ℙJ 𝑎 𝑢 − 𝐶2 − ℙJ 𝑎 𝑑 − 𝐶6 + 𝜆 ℙJ 𝑎 𝐶2 − 𝐶6 − 1 + 𝜇ℙJJ 𝑎 (𝐶2 − 𝐶6) 	= 0 (26) 
 𝜆: ℙ 𝑎 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝐶6 − 𝑎 ≥ 0, 𝜆 ≥ 0, 𝜆[ℙ 𝑎 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝐶6 − 𝑎] = 0 (27) 𝜇: ℙJ 𝑎 (𝐶2 − 𝐶6) − 1 = 0 (28) 
 𝛾:	𝐶6 ≥ 0, 𝛾 ≥ 0, and 	𝛾𝐶6 = 0. (29) 
 
First, consider Equation (28): Assuming 𝐶6 > 0 implies γ = 0, then 𝜆 = 1 − 𝜇 ℙ(A)ℙL(A) = 1 + 𝜇 ℙ(A)UNℙL(A). This means ℙJ a = ℙJ a − 1 which is a contradiction. Thus, 𝐶6 = 0. From Equation (26) we get 𝐶6 = 0. If 𝜆 = 0,  
 𝜇 = ℙ(a)ℙL(a), thus 
 ℙJ 𝑎 𝐶2 = 1 ⟹	𝐶2 = UℙL(A), (30) 
hence ℙJ 𝑎∗∗ = U2N6 1 − ℙLL A ℙ AℙL A c . (31) 
 
Because – ℙLL A ℙ AℙL A c  is strictly positive and ℙ ∙  is strictly concave, 𝑎∗∗ < 𝑎∗. State-contingent compensations (𝐶2 and 𝐶6) can be derived as follows:  
 ℙ 𝑎∗∗ 𝐶2 ≥ 𝑎∗∗ ⟹ 𝐶2 ≥ A∗∗ℙ A∗∗ 	and	𝐶6 = 0.  (32) 
 
If 𝜆 > 0, then  
 ℙ 𝑎 𝐶2 = 𝑎 ⟹ U>O = ℙ(A)A ,  (33) 
 
and  
 ℙ′ 𝑎 𝐶2 = 1 ⟹ ℙJ(𝑎) = U>O = ℙ(A)A .   (34) 
 
That is, the only effort level satisfying 𝑎ℙJ 𝑎 = ℙ(𝑎) is zero (𝑎∗∗ = 0) which is less than the optimal level (𝑎∗) under 
observable action. To this end, we find when the borrower’s managerial decision is unobservable she exerts less effort 
and the probability of default increases: corporate moral hazard. Therefore, the resulting second-best solution (SBS) 
is  
 𝑆𝐵𝑆 = 𝑎∗∗, 𝐶2∗∗, 𝐶6∗∗ 𝑎∗∗ = 𝐶6∗∗ = 0⋀	𝐶2∗∗ = ℙ′ 0 NU . (35) 
 
2.3. First-Best Solution When the Lender Can Penalize The Borrower’s Losses 
 
In case where the lender-borrower relationship is a repeated game, i.e. a long-term series of loan contracts between 
the bank and the firm, the lender can penalize the borrower’s moral hazard behavior. The bank can raise the interest 
rate when the operating performance of the corporate project is poor thereby increasing the likelihood of a borrower’s 
default on the bank loan, or the bank can reject a subsequent debt rollover or re-financing. This is due to the nature of 
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indirect financing the firm sought in the first place. Had the firm raised capital through direct financing, the shareholder 
may unload her stakes in times of bad operating results, or the bond investor may liquidate the firm: no re-negotiation.  
 
Thus, a feature of indirect financing that the bank can punish or compensate for the corporate earnings performance 
means that the downside compensation 𝐶6 can either be positive or negative. This makes the FBS feasible for the 
lender which was only achievable under unobservable borrower’s managerial decisions. The optimal contract can be 
drafted by maximizing the bank’s profit (Equation (36)) subject to the individual rationality (Equation (37)) and 
incentive criterion (Equation (38)) constraints as follows: 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥>?,,A [ℙ 𝑎 𝑉 𝑢 − 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝑉 𝑑 − 𝐶6 ] (36) 
 s. t.			ℙ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶6 ≥ 𝑎 (37) 
 ℙJ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶2 − ℙJ 𝑎 𝑈 𝐶6 = 1. (38) 
 
Assuming that both parties are risk-neutral, by Lagrangian 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥>?,A,H,Z ℙ 𝑎 𝑢 − 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝑑 − 𝐶6   																		+𝜆 ℙ 𝑎 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝐶6 − 𝑎 + 𝜇 ℙJ 𝑎 (𝐶2 − 𝐶6) − 1 . (39) 
 
The FOCs are 
 𝐶2: −ℙ 𝑎 + 𝜆ℙ 𝑎 + 𝜇ℙJ 𝑎 = 0 (40) 
 𝐶6:		− 1 − ℙ 𝑎 + 𝜆 1 − ℙ 𝑎 − 𝜇ℙJ 𝑎 = 0 (41) 
 𝑎: ℙJ 𝑎 𝑢 − 𝐶2 − ℙJ 𝑎 𝑑 − 𝐶6 + 𝜆 ℙJ 𝑎 𝐶2 − 𝐶6 − 1 + 𝜇ℙJJ 𝑎 (𝐶2 − 𝐶6) 	= 0 (42) 
 𝜆: ℙ a Ci + 1 − ℙ a Cj − a ≥ 0, 𝜆 ≥ 0, 𝜆[ℙ 𝑎 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝐶6 − 𝑎] = 0 (43) 
 𝜇: ℙJ a (Ci − Cj) − 1 = 0. (44) 
 
From Equation (43), if λ=0, then 𝜇 = ℙ(A)ℙL(A) = ℙ A NUℙL(A)  which is a contradiction, thus λ > 0 and this gives a binding 
condition such that 
 ℙ 𝑎 𝐶2 + 1 − ℙ 𝑎 𝐶6 = 𝑎 ⟹ ℙ 𝑎 = AN>R>ON>R. (45) 
 
Equations (40) and (41) yield 
 𝜇 = ℙ A UNHℙL A = ℙ A NU UNHℙL A ⟹ 𝜆 = 1	and	𝜇 = 0.	 (46) 
 
Equation (44) prescribes 
 ℙJ 𝑎 𝐶2 − 𝐶6 = 1 ⟹ 𝐶2 − 𝐶6 = UℙL A  (47) 
 
which further implies 
 ℙJ 𝑎 𝑢 − 𝑑 − UℙL A = 0 ⟹ ℙJ 𝑎 = U2N6.  (48) 
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Thus, with presence of a downside penalizing option entitled to the bank, the optimal contract is equivalent to the FBS 
under no hidden action. In other words, a bank loan plays an effective monitoring role in curbing moral hazard 
incentive. Therefore, the optimal contract is  
 𝐹𝐵𝑆 = 𝑎∗∗∗, 𝐶2∗∗∗, 𝐶6∗∗∗ ℙ′ 𝑎∗∗∗ = U2N6 	⋀	ℙ 𝑎∗∗∗ = A∗∗∗N>R>ON>R . (49) 
 
3. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
 
Other than the monitoring role of a bank loan modeled in Section 2, equity and debt financing instruments also are 
known for their effective functions in preventing managerial moral hazard by facilatating independent board members, 
institutional monitoring creditors etc. Does corporate moral hazard behavior vary in the cross-section of various 
financing methods? How can we account for the influence of securitization (Wang and Xia, 2014; Nadauld and 
Weisbach, 2012)? What happens after covenant violations (Saunders et al., 2012; Nini et al., 2012; Roberts and Sufi, 
2009; Chava and Roberts, 2008)? In order to answer these questions, we now turn to identifying the objective, 
explanatory and control variables to be collectively framed in regression models. 
 
3.1. Variables and Regression Model 
 
Following the literature (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Yung and Zender, 2010), a likely proxy 
for moral hazard is the variance (AbVariance) of abnormal stock return bench-marked with the associated industry 
index return. So is free cash flow (FreeCashFlow) a proxy for moral hazard (Jensen, 1986). The key explanatory 
variables to gauge the degree of moral hazard of corporate managerial decisions are the financing means which are 
the proportions of bank loan (Loan), bond (Bond), and equity (Equity) over the total value of external financing and 
the squared terms of respective instruments to control for the effect of over-financed excess capital. The auxiliary 
variables to see additional effect as interaction terms are categorized into three groups of respective financing vehicle. 
For the bank loan, these are the period of relationship with the main bank (Period), the number of loaning banks 
(NumBank). The ones associated with debt capital are the share of main creditor (MainCreditor), government share in 
percentage or as a dummy variable (Government). The last group of interacts with equity financing are the number of 
independent board members (Independent), largest ownership (Largest), and institutional holdings (Institution). The 
controls for firm characteristics are the age of incorporation (Age), firm size (Size), industry indicators (Industry), and 
developed market dummy (Developed). Overall, our empirical questions are raised as follows: 
 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑1	 = 𝑎 + 𝑏q ∙ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 + 𝑏U	 ∙ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛×𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 + 𝑏U	 ∙ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛×𝑁𝑢𝑚𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 +𝑐q ∙ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 + 𝑐U ∙ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑×𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝑐| ∙ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑×𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 +𝑑U ∙ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦×𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 + 𝑑| ∙ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦×𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 + 𝑑 ∙ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦×𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +𝑒 ∙ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝑓 ∙ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝑔1 ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ℎ1 ∙ 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑑 + 𝜖1. (50) 
 
Readers should carefully treat potential endogeneity issues. For example, the model predicts that moral hazard is lower 
the longer is the relationship with the main bank. However, the length of the banking relationship may also depend on 
the probability and severity of moral hazard behavior where banks are more likely to extend lending if the manager is 
expected to show less of moral hazard behavior. Similar concerns apply to most other independent variables, 
questioning the validity of the empirical model. 
 
3.2. Predictions  
 
Based on the aforementioned regression model (Equation 50), we can postulate testable hypotheses as follows: 
 
 Moral hazard is expected to be less the higher the weight of bank loan over total external financing, the 
longer the relationship with the main bank, or the more the number of loaning banks. 
 The degree of moral hazard will alleviate the larger the bond share, or the higher the share of main 
creditor and/or government. 
 The degree of moral hazard will aggravate the less the number of independent board members, the larger 
the share of the largest ownership (not related to the CEO), or the lower the institutional holdings. 
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 These predictions may vary across the borders in terms of magnitude depending on the degree of 
economic development, and also between common and civil law systems. 
 
These predictions are not restricted to specific markets or economies. Our readers may develop testing procedures 
based on any geographically concentrated data that are accessible to them. 
 
4. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER AGENDA 
 
In this paper, we discussed optimal contract drafting between a lender with deficient monitoring capabilities and an 
agency-ridden borrower with insufficient budget to finance an investable project. The theoretical implications are as 
follows: First, the first best solution (FBS) is achievable under no hidden action. However, the borrower’s action is 
hardly observable in practice. Second, with unobservable managerial decisions the borrower exerts sub-optimal effort 
(moral hazard), and the probability of default increases. Lastly, with a penalizing discretion entitled to the bank on a 
long-term contract, the financial intermediary will be able to control the firm’s managerial action effectively such that 
the solution is equivalent to the FBS attained under no hidden action. Readers are left to identifying and procuring 
relevant databases to implement empirical exercise procedures suggested in Section 3. As a concluding remark, the 
regulatory authorities can alleviate the costs of asymmetric information among banks and corporations by pressing 
the transparency of accounting information publication and the internal control of credit users. 
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